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Abstract: I argue that humans have a duty to socialise with domesticated animals, especially members of 
farmed animal species: to make efforts to include them in our social lives in circumstances that make 
friendships possible.  Put another way, domesticated animals have a claim to opportunities to befriend 
humans, in addition to (and constrained by) a basic welfare-related right to socialise with members of their 
own and other species.  This is because i) domesticated animals are in a currently unjust scheme of social 
cooperation with, and dependence upon, humans; and ii) ongoing human moral attention and ‘social 
capital’, of which personal friendships are an indispensable source, is critical if their interests are to be 
represented robustly and their agency enabled in a just interspecies community.  I then argue that 
participation in farmed animal sanctuaries is a promising way to fulfil this duty, lending support to 
conceptions of sanctuary as just interspecies community.  
Keywords: friendship, animal ethics, interspecies justice, sanctuary, moral psychology, love, partiality  
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Introduction 
The political turn in animal ethics has enriched and concretised notions of interspecies moral 
‘kinship’ and ‘community’ of the sort developed in moral philosophy, reframing questions of 
what humans should and should not do to other animals within visions of how to live well with 
them as members of multi-species communities.1 Donaldson and Kymlicka, for example, enjoin 
us ‘to see animals not solely as vulnerable and suffering individuals but also as neighbours, 
friends, co-citizens, and members of communities ours and theirs’ (Zoopolis 24; cf. 40).   
These categories – neighbours, friends, community members – are not, I suggest, just 
evocations of a central theme or structure, but are irreducible and indispensable to any 
sufficiently robust conception of interspecies justice.  On any substantial understanding of 
membership, whether Donaldson and Kymlicka’s group-differentiated citizenship model or 
another scheme, domesticated animals are owed rich forms of moral regard as well as duties of 
assisted agency so that they can participate meaningfully and equitably in social and political life.  
In turn, as Donaldson and Kymlicka make clear, any such process of ‘expecting agency, looking 
for agency, and enabling agency’ (Zoopolis 110), however it is framed by formal procedures of 
justice, must be borne out in lived experiences with nonhuman animals as individuals.  In 
providing a provisional roster of rights and responsibilities for nonhuman community members, 
Donaldson and Kymlicka stress that this process is embodied, experimental, and ongoing, 
drawing on examples of personal relationships between humans and dogs, cows, and donkeys 
(Zoopolis 119-122).  Intimate, reciprocal relationships including friendships thus provide crucial 
substance and motivation for the project of just interspecies community, since ‘the nature of 
dependent agency is that it is created through relationship, not deducible from the innate 
capacities of individuals’ (Zoopolis 122). 
In this article, I elaborate on the transformative potential of personal friendships in 
constructing a just interspecies community.  My proposal here is addressed to the political turn: 
granted a broadly liberal animal rights framework, I explore how particular practices and 
patterns of interspecies friendship might contribute to interspecies (in)justice.  This article 
consists of three parts.  In the first section, I review some arguments about the ethics and moral 
psychology of human-nonhuman friendships, identifying an impasse in their over-reliance on 
DUTIES TO SOCIALISE WITH DOMESTICATED ANIMALS 
 
88 
dominant modes of interspecies companionship.  In the second section, I supplement this work 
with some recent arguments in the (human-centric) ethics of friendship and sociability to argue 
for the existence of a duty for humans to socialise with domesticated animals in ways that make 
new and diverse friendships possible.  In the final section, I ask how this duty might feasibly be 
exercised within present conditions of injustice and segregation, identifying the farmed animal 
sanctuary movement as a particularly promising avenue for a renewal of interspecies amity.  In 
turn, the duty to socialise with farmed animals offers normative support for conceptions of 
sanctuary that prioritise the building of diverse, resistant communities of justice. 
 
1. Ethics, Moral Psychology, and Interspecies Amity 
The existing philosophical literature on interspecies friendship has several notable limits for the 
purpose of linking personal friendship practices to the political turn.  One branch of this work, 
drawing in particular from the feminist ethics of care, recuperates interspecies love and 
friendship from their earlier dismissal in the mainstream of animal ethics, often by positing the 
affective and relational as alternatives to discourses of animal rights and justice, in tension with 
the foundational principles and methods of the latter.  Only now is work being done to 
overcome this impasse within a liberal orientation to interspecies justice, most notably by Tony 
Milligan (‘The Politicization of Animal Love’), but the impetus for my proposal here can be 
found in the earlier claims of scholars such as Brian Luke: 
[R]ather than focusing exclusively on logic and considerations of formal consistency, we 
might better remember our feeling connections to animals, while challenging ourselves 
and others to overthrow the unnatural obstacles to the further development of these 
feelings.  This process of reconnecting with animals is essentially concrete, involving 
relations with healthy, free animals, as well as direct perceptions of the abuses suffered 
by animals on farms and in laboratories.  (312) 
In the same vein, Anca Gheaus argues that interspecies friendships disclose a crucial 
dimension of reciprocity missing from the models of exchange and cooperation often found in 
moral and political theory (592).  This way of appreciating our ‘common predicament’ with 
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other animals as loveable and love-giving creatures, with strong roots in the ethics of care 
tradition, offers a countermeasure to (though not a replacement for) an animal ethics focused on 
specifying the distinct interests and capacities of different animals (595).  Partiality, 
appropriately inclined by the moral imagination, might then be seen not as a hindrance to but 
rather a foundation for further moral striving: ‘Actual love, as well as the ability to love and be 
loved by people with whom we have personal bonds, is one basis for valuing distant others and 
helps identify people in general as morally significant.  […]  [S]ympathies can be extended 
outwards from pets to other animals’ – in Gheaus’s example, from a dog companion to a liminal 
mouse (595).  This approach ‘legitimize[s] special consideration for pets and animals who might 
become pets, and rejects the status quo of excessive care for pets while, at the same time, we as a 
society destroy, abuse, and exploit, for mere comfort, innumerable other animals’ (596).  But 
since Gheaus does not directly challenge the distribution of ‘actual love’ between animals who 
are pets and animals who are potential pets, her admittedly provisional appeals to the moral 
imagination are left to do much of the legwork.  As I will consider below, this opens up 
psychological and practical questions about how this imaginative extension should be cultivated. 
As for the ethics of interspecies friendships developed within a broadly liberal rights 
discourse, three features are of note.  First, this work has tended to focus on the nature and 
ramifications of relationships (real or hypothetical) that are already under way, a feature carried 
across from the literature on human friendship (Goering 401).  Second, taking ‘companion 
animals’ such as cats and dogs and conventional institutions of pet-keeping as paradigmatic, this 
scholarship traces the obligations and limits that follow from partiality, connecting with work on 
an array of important applied issues such as companion animal diets, reproductive rights, and 
healthcare.  Third, to the extent that this area of the literature has considered the connection 
between personal friendships and interspecies justice, it has tended to draw lessons from moral 
psychology based solely on relationships developed within these existing dominant practices.   
Cynthia Townley, for example, argues that humans may indeed form robust friendships 
with (some) nonhuman animals – seen best in relationships ‘with dogs and perhaps cats’ 
(‘Animals as Friends’ 46) – but concludes that ‘acknowledging friendship with animals is less of 
an advantage for animals than might be hoped’ (54).  This is because, according to Townley, the 
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moral leverage gained from appealing to (existing and putative) interspecies friendships has 
limited psychological traction:  
As humans, we are good at inconsistency, bad at consistency, so an appeal to 
consistency seems unlikely to engender much change.  In any case, a deeper problem is 
that friendship seems to be about partial and preferential rather than consistent 
treatment, so it isn’t the right conceptual mechanism to motivate a general concern.  
(‘Animals as Friends’ 56) 
Bernard Rollin is more sanguine about the moral leverage that might be gained by 
cultivating reasonable partiality in our ‘love/friendship’ relationships with companion animals 
(Rollin 119).  The most effective sorts of ethical dialogue, Rollin suggests, non-adversarially 
assist interlocutors in disentangling and reweaving their pre-existing sentiments, practical 
commitments, and principles (107-109).  In matters of animal ethics, this involves reflecting on 
our own personal relations with nonhuman animals.  Improving the treatment of companion 
animals, then, should be prioritised both for its own sake as a relational duty, and also in order 
to consolidate interspecies philia as a social resource for thinking well about nonhuman animals 
more broadly.  Yet Rollin is not clear here on how this prioritisation and consolidation should 
occur – other than, presumably, through incremental reforms in animal welfare policies – and 
he, too, draws a cautious conclusion: 
[W]e can anticipate that improving the treatment of companion animals will raise our 
moral sensitivity to all animals, and eventually change our current willingness to accept 
moral exploitation of certain animals for essentially selfish reasons.  But, for the 
moment, moral common sense will continue to draw a distinction, not easily eroded, 
between animals we care for and animals we use.  (121) 
There are some good reasons to think that Townley and Rollin are right to be cautious 
here.  As Siobhan O’Sullivan has detailed, while some companion animals may function as 
‘gateway animals’, inducing moral reflection about the plights of non-companion animals (103), 
human-nonhuman relations are riven with ‘internal contradictions’: wide disparities in the 
norms and legal frameworks governing how members of the same species may be treated in 
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different institutional contexts within a given society.  Recent empirical work indicates that 
public opinions on animal experimentation do not differ appreciably between that conducted on 
companion animal species and non-companion species (Cox and Montrose), suggesting the 
limited moral leverage of relationships with companion animals in themselves for overcoming 
these contradictions – let alone the ‘external contradiction’ of the moral status of nonhuman 
animals at large. 
If this is right, then proposals for a substantial role for love in animal ethics of the sort 
advanced by Luke and Gheaus are at risk of being psychologically under-motivated.  
Nonetheless, as Milligan contends, practical reason can only unseat the deep background picture 
of animal exploitation as the ‘authentic’ or ‘natural’ way of life if animal advocates develop a 
sufficiently rich ‘combination of argument and of representing (picturing) what it is to live well’ 
(Beyond Animal Rights 4).  Such a picture includes, in Milligan’s own rendering, a thickening of 
the political turn by re-engaging with the moral emotions in general, and with the political 
valences of interspecies love and friendship in particular (‘The Politicization of Animal Love’).  
How, then, might we connect the practices and institutions of personal friendship with 
interspecies philia as a civic ideal?  In the following section, I propose a bridging concept: a duty 
to socialise with domesticated animals that challenges existing patterns of sociability and calls for 
practical change to invigorate the moral imagination of interspecies justice. 
 
2. ‘Choosing One’s Friends’ in an Interspecies Community 
Both Townley’s argument about moral leverage and Rollin’s emphasis on the gradual evolution 
of norms through best practices are concerned with acknowledging and cultivating relationships 
within the conventional companion animal paradigm.  As one of the central legal and cultural 
institutions structuring human-animal relations, this pet paradigm is undeniably important to 
examine in its own right.  By shifting focus to the ethics of beginning friendships, however, I 
broaden the terms of this discussion beyond ‘gateway animals’ to include the domesticated 
animals currently bracketed out of many of these discussions; that is, animals whose 
predominant social classification is (for example) as ‘food’, ‘farm’, or ‘laboratory’ animals.  This 
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move accomplishes three things.  First, it expands the framework for moral leverage: instead of 
just ‘acknowledging friendship with animals’ (Townley, ‘Animals as Friends’ 56), or 
appreciating that some other animals ‘might become pets’ (Gheaus 596), it puts the prospect of 
renewed human relationships with a variety of domesticated species within the scope of plausible 
friendship practices.  Second, by raising issues about fairness, diversity, and discrimination in the 
formation of friendships and social groups, this shift responds to Townley’s worry that 
friendship is the wrong framework for motivating broader moral concern for other species 
because all particular friendships involve partial and preferential treatment.  Third, my 
discussion addresses the concern I raised with Rollin’s approach: that his view of the inertia of 
‘moral common sense’ is overly concessive, since he does not consider how interspecies philia 
outside the pet paradigm might be consolidated as a resource for moral change.  I do so by 
highlighting the emerging possibilities of farmed animal sanctuaries as pioneering sites of 
interspecies amity, lending the ethics of interspecies friendship a proactive, institutional focus 
with bridges to political theories of animal rights.   
I begin by returning to some arguments in the human-centric ethics of friendship and 
sociability which so far have not, to my knowledge, been applied to animal ethics.2  Sarah 
Goering, reflecting on feminist challenges to the principle of impartiality as ‘epistemologically 
and emotionally impossible’ (400), suggests that we might nonetheless steer our personal 
relationships in light of an impartial ideal such as fairness by purposefully cultivating difficult and 
diverse opportunities for friendship.  She stops short of calling this possibility a duty, but does 
not rule out doing so, arguing here only ‘that a number of goods are achieved through the 
diversification of friendship, and that such diversification is not only psychologically possible, but 
also morally admirable’ (401).  These goods include a more equitable diffusion of the personal 
pleasures and benefits of friendship, but also moral experiences brought about by intimate, 
reciprocal immersion in the perspective of another, along with potential moral resources: the 
bridging of social capital, and motivation and support for newly common causes  
(Goering 406-7). 
More recently, Stephanie Collins has argued for a position strongly anchored in 
impartialism, with the more demanding conclusion that there is indeed something like a ‘duty to 
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make friends’ in accordance with impartial principles, and even to steer other special 
relationships, such as the decision to adopt a child instead of conceiving one.  For Collins, 
‘impartial justifications can ground special duties in a coherent and satisfying way’ by positing 
prior ‘duties to perform actions and adopt attitudes that increase the chance of special 
relationships being formed’ (920), where those relationships would align the moral reasons and 
motivations of partial duties with impartial requirements. 
Neither argument devotes much attention to specific patterns of discrimination within 
partiality, or to the institutions and policies that scaffold our social lives.  Since Goering is 
focused on getting her argument off the ground with a provisional definition of ‘impartiality, and 
its goals of reducing bias and promoting fair treatment’ (410), she does not explicitly invoke a 
conception of oppression or extreme disadvantage, except by way of briefly discounting racism 
and sexism as morally legitimate sources of partiality (400) and productive diversity (405).  She 
defers the question of just how the many possibilities of choosing one’s friends should be 
evaluated: ‘We need to figure out what it is that we do value, and how that is supported by 
certain kinds of diversity’ (406).  Collins refers only to a speculative case – ‘a society which has a 
strong taboo against friendships between persons of different classes’ – in order to establish that 
some opportunities to fulfil her duty may only be feasible with a collective effort, or with 
institutional support, though she suggests that this may be ‘a lot to ask of governments’ in liberal 
societies (919). 
Goering’s and Collins’s arguments, however, would seem to apply with particular 
urgency to efforts to breach the more extreme patterns of (un)sociability shaped by enduring 
injustices.  In such cases, Goering’s argument too may come to look less like an advisory ideal 
and more like a distinct duty.  Granted the existence of a dialectic of oppression, wherein 
disadvantage and ill treatment promote the many modes of social invisibility, and social 
invisibility reinforces disadvantage, the need for the moral resources nurtured by friendships 
becomes keener, and the prospect of transformative moral experiences sharper, if more 
challenging.  Friendships that reach over the fault-lines of oppression may open our moral 
attention not only to the particular ways in which our social horizons are structured by 
prejudices, material inequalities, and forms of spatial segregation, but also to the particular 
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personal qualities and forms of goodness that endure under oppression, and the many ways they 
might flourish in its absence. 
Lori Gruen (‘The Faces of Animal Oppression’) provides one framework for 
understanding how nonhuman animals face such a dialectic of oppression, and why they may 
have corresponding interests in social representation and human ‘cultural capital’ even when 
they cannot comprehend these phenomena as such.  Adapting Iris Marion Young’s analysis of the 
‘five faces’ of oppression, Gruen observes that nonhuman animals in factory farms, laboratories, 
and other forms of intensive animal ‘use’ suffer not just from systemic violence, exploitation, 
and powerlessness, but also from Young’s less obviously applicable categories of marginalisation 
and cultural imperialism: whether exoticised in zoos or infantilised as pets, ‘nonhuman animals 
are forced to conform to the human rituals and practices’ that confine them to expedient and 
stereotyped spaces, relationships, and behaviours (161-165).  These stereotypes shape what we 
think nonhuman animals can be or do, and so what we might be or do with them.  An integrated 
analysis of oppression attunes the moral imagination to the cumulative, structurally reinforcing 
effects of these factors in ways that utility- or rights-based enumerations of the harms involved 
do not readily accommodate (171-172). 
Combined with arguments that friendships with nonhuman animals can be mutually 
meaningful and motivating in sufficiently involved ways (for example, Milligan, ‘The 
Politicization of Animal Love’ 195-197; Townley, ‘Friendship with Companion Animals’), a 
duty to (take reasonable steps to) socialise equitably with domesticated animals begins to look 
like a plausible extension of human-centric arguments that we ought to ‘think much more 
carefully, and much more morally’ (Collins 920), about how, where, and with whom we hang 
out.  Or, to put this conclusion in terms more appreciative of the ideal of assisted agency from 
which I began, domesticated animals have a claim to opportunities to befriend humans from 
diverse backgrounds.  In light of Gruen’s account of oppression, the practical focus of this duty 
should be members of those species most vulnerable and marginalised in our society, which I 
take at present to be those exploited in industrial animal agriculture and biomedical research.  
For reasons of space, I focus subsequently on the case of farmed animals, and so speak also of a 
‘duty to socialise with farmed animals’.  A move beyond the ethics of friendship within the 
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conventional companion animal paradigm, this duty to socialise with farmed animals calls even – 
or perhaps especially – to self-professed ‘animal lovers,’ and to city-bound animal ethics scholars 
and activists (myself included).   
The notion of ‘choosing one’s friends’ or a ‘duty to make friends’ may sound, at first 
blush, sterile and onerous.  Neither phrase is strictly accurate: the duty is rather about 
cultivating new opportunities for friendships to develop, as they always must, through mutual 
interest and affection.  Nonetheless, could this duty be formally sound, but socially and 
psychologically self-defeating, including in the interspecies case? Goering addresses this concern 
by acknowledging that the duty calls for certain special efforts at the outset which may involve 
awkwardness and discomfort (406), as many social situations do.  However, she points out that 
most friendships develop from some coincidental interest or situation which brings people 
together; caring for some particular other for their own sake may result from, but is not a 
precondition for, the social circumstances which lead to friendship (408).  As such, it is not clear 
that an initial conscious inclination of the sort provided by this duty would eclipse the ‘natural 
warmth and ease’ (407) which we rightly expect, in time, of a good friendship.  As Collins 
specifies, ‘the duty is just to increase the chance of a process succeeding whereby a relationship 
develops organically.  Special relationships are two-way streets: one cannot form or stay in a 
special relationship on one’s own.  One can only make it likely’ (917, emphasis in original). 
This duty, then, is instrumental in that it aspires to steer our social lives in the interests 
of impartiality – but the new friendships it aspires to bring about need not, and certainly should 
not, be primarily instrumental relationships.  The goal is to redirect equitably, not to dissipate, 
rich forms of partiality and the goods these encompass.3  However, it is important here to 
distinguish this duty from the rights of domesticated animals to have their social needs met.  I 
take these rights to be prior to and constraining on any duty to socialise with domesticated 
animals, meaning that any program encouraging humans to socialise with farmed animals will 
need to be conscientious in appreciating and enabling these animals’ needs with respect to their 
own and other non-human species: needs for (amongst other things) group affiliation, play, 
family life, and solitude.  This is why the duty I outline applies only to relationships with 
domesticated animals: even though wild and liminal animals4 also are subject to oppression in 
DUTIES TO SOCIALISE WITH DOMESTICATED ANIMALS 
 
96 
human campaigns of dispossession and extermination, and so also are owed forms of justice 
buttressed by moral esteem of the sort cultivated by friendships, their own social and 
environmental needs, and the increased risks to both parties, preclude the sort of concerted 
socialising that would make such friendships possible and desirable.5 
Martha Nussbaum captures something akin to this distinction between intrinsic social 
needs and the broader set of needs to which social duties may respond by separating nonhuman 
animals’ basic entitlement to affiliation into two parts.  According to Nussbaum’s adaptation of 
her list of central human capabilities, nonhuman animals are entitled:  
to engage in characteristic forms of bonding and interrelationship.  They are also 
entitled to relations with humans, where humans enter the picture, that are rewarding 
and reciprocal, rather than tyrannical.  At the same time, they are entitled to live in a 
world public culture that respects them and treats them as dignified beings.   
(Nussbaum 316)  
Nussbaum here imagines this ‘world public culture’ in formal terms (‘world policies that grant 
them political rights and the legal status of dignified beings’; 316), yet she follows this with 
another principle: 
If human beings are entitled to ‘be able to live with concern for and in relation to 
animals, plants, and the world of nature,’ so too are other animals, in relation to species 
not their own, including the human species, and the rest of the natural world.  
(Nussbaum 316-317) 
A human duty to socialise with domesticated animals offers one way of elaborating how 
these entitlements fit together, and how we might also contribute to a ‘world public culture’ of 
regard for nonhuman animals at the scale of personal relationships and local institutions.  As J. S. 
Reinders observes, the ‘politics of inclusion’ has advanced an effective mandate for bringing 
people with intellectual disabilities into public spaces, providing critical opportunities for their 
agency and social visibility; yet this is not all that a politics of inclusion can or should mean.  
Reinders suggests: 
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If community living is a human experience, we should expect that people with 
disabilities want to be included in the lives of others … not only as bearers of 
institutional roles, but as friends and companions who have chosen them to be part of 
their lives.  (Reinders 3, emphasis in original) 
Reinders grounds this point in a claim about the nature of humans as the sort of beings who 
‘long to be welcome and accepted by others’ (3) whereas, as I have acknowledged, the 
fulfilment of this social longing in other species may be completely separable from friendships 
with humans, though many domesticated animals surely express this want too.  However, 
Reinders is also making a point here about the sort of regard embodied by these social others 
towards people with intellectual disabilities in building ‘a moral culture in which they can 
flourish’ (4); here, the challenge in supporting those with intellectual disabilities is ‘not so much 
what we can do for them, but whether or not we want to be with them’ (5).  Provided it is 
compatible with intrinsic rights to social fulfilment and psychological wellbeing, I suggest that to 
endorse a vision of just interspecies community – community living as a more-than-human 
experience – is to endorse a comparable politics of inclusion for domesticated animals that 
entails proactive forms of both institutional and personal inclusion. 
This appeal to the case of humans with intellectual disabilities suggests a second 
qualification of the duty to socialise with domesticated animals: just as this duty is constrained by 
the social and psychological needs of nonhuman animals, so too it must be sensitive to the 
diverse needs of humans with, for instance, different social capacities, animal phobias, or 
traumatic experiences related to animals.  For some people, there may be no reasonable moral 
demand to socialise with nonhuman animals at all, while for others the experience may only be 
mutually constructive in certain circumstances and with special assistance.  In these latter cases, 
the duty suggests a new framing for the mutual goods expected of an ‘animal-assisted  
activity’ paradigm. 
A third question about the scope of the duty arises when considering how it should 
accommodate the freedoms of domesticated animals to pursue their own lives, including 
opportunities to ‘completely opt out of shared human-animal society’ (Donaldson and 
Kymlicka, Zoopolis 121).  This prospect will always stand in some tension to positive obligations 
DUTIES TO SOCIALISE WITH DOMESTICATED ANIMALS 
 
98 
of assistance and inclusion, but in a given institutional context, an approach that emphasises the 
importance of friendships might in fact lend greater consideration to arrangements that prioritise 
mobility and flexibility over protection and oversight in animals’ day-to-day lives (more on 
which in the next section).  After all, we can only know that someone wants to be our friend if 
they have ample opportunities for recreation and socialising that do not involve us. 
Qualified in these ways, and responding to a complex of harms that it cannot by itself 
overcome, the duty to socialise with domesticated animals is an imperfect duty.  As in intra-
human versions of the duty, its demandingness cannot easily be specified in the abstract, and will 
depend on all parties’ social capacities, existing relationships, and resources.  In the next 
section, I approach the practical implications of the duty less from the perspective of individual 
agents and more from the complementary perspective of institutions, suggesting that farmed 
animal sanctuaries could conceive of their mission in part as assisting people in feasibly 
exercising this duty. 
 
3. Farmed Animal Sanctuaries: Frontiers of Justice, Frontiers of Friendship 
Where can we go to socialise with farmed animals?  It should be a place where the reasonably 
minimal generative conditions of friendship are present: an environment where (to make some 
non-exhaustive suggestions) both parties are comfortable, secure in their basic needs, and free to 
initiate and exit interactions with one another; where mutual interests and purposes can be 
explored over time; and where a ‘presumption of authority’ (Goering 403) is not manifest for 
either party.  This already rules out the vast majority of the domestic populations of cows, pigs, 
chickens, and other species who are sequestered in intensive animal agriculture operations which 
work hard to limit even perfunctory access to, and oversight of, their operations.   
This spatial and legal segregation of farmed animals is buttressed by a profound cultural 
denigration of interspecies sociality, the companion-animal paradigm notwithstanding.  To 
illustrate just one strand of this culture of human supremacy, the neglect of animal friendships 
even in the study of animal behaviour is perhaps unsurprising, but nonetheless striking: only in 
2011 did ethologist Anne Dagg write the first book-length treatment of animal friendships.6  
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Detailing a wide array of intra- and inter-species amity, she reflects: ‘All zoologists in the field 
keep copious notes and records of what animals are doing each day, but these have tended 
toward documentation of aggression and reproduction,’ even though these activities are rare 
relative to everyday practices of non-sexual intimacy and companionship (Dagg 4).  Not so long 
ago, ‘friendship’ was ‘the F-word’ of primatology (Silk 421); and, as Frans de Waal observes of 
his own experience in studying chimpanzees, this conceptual policing looks less like scientific 
parsimony and more like the expression of an anthropocentric bias in its own right:  
Whereas terms related to aggression, violence, and competition never posed the 
slightest problem, I was supposed to switch to dehumanized language as soon as the 
affectionate aftermath of a fight was the issue.  A reconciliation sealed with a kiss 
became a ‘postconflict interaction involving mouth-to-mouth contact.’  (de Waal 18) 
Without venturing any specific ethological claims in response, the point here is that the motif of 
‘animal passions’ continues strongly to connote spectacles of mating and aggression of the sort 
favoured by animal documentaries, and not the moments of easy-going curiosity and affection 
that also suffuse animal life, and make the prospect of interspecies friendships possible. 
Yet the concept of a duty to socialise with farmed animals comes at what is, in other 
respects, a propitious moment.  As sanctuaries and rescue operations for farmed animals are 
consolidating and defining their own missions in conversation with each other and with the 
broader animal advocacy movement, scholars are beginning to examine sanctuaries as ethical and 
political spaces, at the frontiers of interspecies justice (for example, Abrell, Saving Animals, 
‘Lively Sanctuaries’; Donaldson and Kymlicka, ‘Farmed Animal Sanctuaries’; Emmerman, 
‘Sanctuary, Not Remedy’).  Sanctuaries are also frontiers of interspecies friendship; and, taken 
together, these dimensions form an opportunity to fulfil the duty I have outlined. 
Donaldson and Kymlicka argue that farmed animal sanctuaries should re-evaluate their 
operative model of care, with important consequences both for the internal organisation of 
sanctuaries and for the movement’s self-conception as a set of institutions negotiating a public 
presence.  They term the prevailing model, as reflected in the stated commitments of various 
sanctuaries, the ‘refuge + advocacy model’ (‘Farmed Animal Sanctuaries’ 51-52).  In its place, 
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they suggest an intentional community model: a vision of sanctuaries as transitional and 
transformative experiments in interspecies justice.  Drawing critical lessons from ‘total 
institutions’ for human care such as asylums and orphanages, the intentional community 
approach challenges some established sanctuary procedures for giving care, making decisions, 
and negotiating risks.7  Donaldson and Kymlicka stress the need to view freedoms of movement, 
association, and labour as opportunities for animal residents to ‘explore different possible lives’ 
(57) in ways that may confound even the best-intentioned human assumptions.   
One distinct sort of moral experience afforded by socialising with diverse others is a 
window into their other relationships: how they navigate their friendships, communities, and 
family lives.  In sanctuaries, the results can upend our expectations of what is possible, not only 
in terms of rescue and rehabilitation, but in new forms of social life: ‘indeed the evidence 
suggests that when opportunities for wider cross-species friendships exist, they are often seized 
upon’ (Donaldson and Kymlicka, ‘Farmed Animal Sanctuaries’ 57).  The intentional community 
model also suggests a changed approach to sanctuary visitors: rather than prioritising a single 
sanctuary visit as an ‘educational moment’ aimed at individual transformation oriented around 
veganism and participation in advocacy (52-53), sanctuaries could adopt a long-term residency 
program with diverse participants, while fostering partnerships with the local community (68).   
Darren Chang offers a different response to the limitations of the existing sanctuary 
model, calling into question the ability of Donaldson and Kymlicka’s intentional community 
model to challenge the legal, spatial, and social partitions of ‘speciesist segregation’.  
Considering models of integration and voluntary separation advanced in the context of human 
struggles for justice, Chang instead proposes to disrupt segregation by promoting a third strategy 
of ‘infiltration’: 
[I]nfiltration involves adopting farmed animals into urban homes, finding creative ways 
to ensure they can flourish within relatively confined and ‘unnatural’ spaces, and work 
towards enabling their micro- and macro-agency within urban areas.  So long as these 
urban farmed animals are able to sustain their clandestine presence from authorities, 
they can subversively form relationships with other humans and animals in their 
environment, as family, friends, neighbours, and so on.  (Chang 14-15) 
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The risks to the animals involved – namely, discovery and capture by the authorities – would 
seem to rise in proportion to the main benefit of increased exposure to communities disinclined 
to visit sanctuaries.  Finding creative ways to encourage more diverse participation in farmed 
animal sanctuaries, then, seems to be the most promising way to promote the duty to socialise 
with farmed animals.  But in circumstances where legal risks and relative opportunities for 
animal flourishing could be managed in concert with community support and with the 
cooperation of sanctuaries, as Chang envisions, infiltration strategies could form a 
complementary exercise of the duty to socialise with farmed animals.  Correspondingly, the 
duty that I have sketched here offers a distinct line of normative support to the proposals of both 
Donaldson and Kymlicka (‘Farmed Animal Sanctuaries’) and Chang, both of which call for more 
involved forms of interspecies relationship-building as a strategic priority for the  
sanctuary movement. 
While I have argued that recognising and pursuing such a duty for ourselves and for 
others widens the framework for moral leverage, this does not, of course, overcome or resolve 
the limitations of moral psychology identified by Townley and Rollin.  Some people do, in fact, 
presently enjoy relationships of mutual affection and intimacy with members of farmed animal 
species while consuming the products of other members of those species.  On smaller farms, 
people may slaughter and consume the very animals with which they have these relationships.  
On the models of friendship which inform my argument, these latter relationships might be 
excluded as instances of genuine friendship.  In contrast to conceptions of friendship that locate 
its moral meaning not just in particular obligations, but in the characteristic open-endedness and 
mutual freedoms of the relationship, the day-to-day operation of such farms enacts a radical 
power imbalance.  Moreover, the farmer’s standing commitment to terminate the relationship – 
indeed, all of the animal’s relationships – at an expedient moment in order to render the animal 
into a commodity sunders the prospects of mutual change in response to one another.  To what 
extent can we be said to be immersed in and responsive to another self when we know exactly 
where and how they will end up in life – and at our doing?  However understood, such 
relationships point nonetheless to propensities for compartmentalisation and rationalisation that 
are undeniable (but not immutable) features of human moral psychology. 
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The successful pursuit of this duty in a sanctuary setting will depend, in part, on how 
such projects are integrated with the running of the sanctuary, and with other education and 
outreach initiatives.  Whether, and to what extent, this changes hearts and minds will depend on 
the design of the program in accordance with demographic and cultural contingencies, all of 
which should be open to empirical substantiation.  As Donaldson and Kymlicka aver, ‘[u]ntil 
such research is available, claims regarding the impact of sanctuaries, and of the visitor 
experience, remain speculative’ (‘Farmed Animal Sanctuaries’ 53).  Programs encouraging 
diverse friendships with farmed animals would therefore best be conducted in conjunction with 
research on the moral psychology of sanctuary experiences, an area that I hope will begin to 
emerge as the interdisciplinary scholarly interest in sanctuaries as frontiers of human-animal 
relations grows.   
The future of interspecies amity will also depend on how sanctuaries build relationships 
of solidarity with other human communities and social justice issues.  Sanctuaries are, after all, 
also sites where human friendships grow; and the intersectional mission of communities such as 
VINE Sanctuary (vine.bravebirds.org/connections/) indicates the potential of viewing duties to 
overcome multiple forms of social segregation as an integrated project.  Farmed animal 
sanctuaries can pursue exchange programs, social and fundraising events, and collective labour 
drives in conjunction with other community organisations and social movements, renewing 
bonds of philia with the larger polity as an integral part of their experiments in just  
interspecies community. 
 
  
 
Notes 
1Tony Milligan argues that a renewed emphasis on positive duties is a defining characteristic of 
the political turn, yielding a thicker (albeit contested) conception of equality in the light of other 
liberal commitments, ‘a context in which justice is done to connections of a more 
communitarian (or ‘fraternal’) sort’ (‘The Political Turn’ 11). Cochrane, Garner, & O’Sullivan 
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demur, pointing on the one hand to prior elaborations of positive duties within animal ethics, 
and on the other to works within the political turn focused on negative rights (4-6). Here, it 
suffices to note that the turn has not yet offered much analysis of the ‘more communitarian’ 
themes suggested by the concepts of friendship or fraternity, and this paper offers one step 
towards that project. 
2 An exchange between Fröding and Peterson (‘Animal Ethics’, ‘Animals and Friendship’) and 
Rowlands (‘Friendship and Animals’, ‘Friendship and Animals, Again’) on the ethics of 
interspecies friendships touches on the point I am considering here.  Rowlands argues that 
Fröding and Peterson’s conclusion – that it is morally worse for a farmer to slaughter a cow than 
it is to hunt a wild animal, because the slaughter violates the terms of an Aristotelian friendship 
of mutual advantage that does not exist between hunter and prey – can only be generalised if 
farmers are in fact always or usually friends with the animals they own, or if it can be shown that 
they ought to be friends, both of which Rowlands denies (‘Friendship and Animals, Again’ 193). 
Of this second approach, Rowlands remarks: ‘Friendship is not the sort of relationship into 
which one can be obliged to enter, no matter how worthy the other in question. It is a matter of 
decision, not obligation.’ (‘Friendship and Animals’ 73) I agree with Rowlands that an obligation 
to be friends with someone is a self-defeating proposition, and with his general tack in defending 
a more involved conception of human–nonhuman friendships and the virtues therein which, 
though it does not hew to Aristotle’s categories, involves both pleasure and admiration as well. 
However, I hope to show in what follows that the conditions under which we make such 
decisions about friendship can involve matters of justice, and that we can be obliged to make 
efforts to change these conditions without jeopardising the constitutive freedoms of friendship. 
3 It is possible to pose the separate question of whether people spend too much (or too little) 
time and effort on partial relationships versus impersonal moral activity as a whole; but even if 
one is committed to the view that the overall levels of partiality are too high and should be 
reduced, a duty to socialise more equitably would still bear upon the resulting distribution 
(Collins 918). 
4 By ‘wild animals’, I mean free-roaming animals whose habitats do not generally overlap with 
human settlements and who do not rely upon human infrastructure or intervention for their 
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subsistence. By ‘liminal animals’, I mean those free-roaming animals who carry out their lives 
amidst human populations, finding opportunities for food, shelter, and sometimes even 
company alongside humans, but who do not generally depend on particular human provisions or 
relationships to meet their needs. 
5 I cannot pursue here the question of how else we might cultivate moral regard for necessarily 
distant and unfamiliar species, but remedial projects of education and cultural representation for 
particular species – proposals more familiar to conservation biology than animal ethics – offer 
one avenue for further investigation. 
6 This sort of observation is not without precedent. In his corrective to a late nineteenth century 
Darwinian social imagination that intoned the apparent law of ‘mutual struggle’ between 
individuals as the motor of (social and biological) evolution, Kropotkin illustrated the adaptive 
pervasiveness of relations of mutual aid and support amongst humans and numerous other 
animal species: ‘Sociability…only now begins to receive due attention from the zoologists.’ 
While Kropotkin grounded this sociability in a prototypical sense of solidarity and justice – ‘a 
feeling infinitely wider than love or personal sympathy’ that binds both human and nonhuman 
communities together – he readily acknowledged forms of love, friendship, and compassion in 
birds and mammals on a continuum with their human counterparts. I thank an anonymous 
reviewer for suggesting the connection to Kropotkin’s work on mutual aid. 
7 Elan Abrell (‘Lively Sanctuaries’) offers a biopolitical reading of these same institutional 
dilemmas of care, suggesting that sanctuaries might press beyond the conflicts and paradoxes of 
competing schemes of pastoral governance by attending to the political liveliness of sanctuaries 
as ‘zones of exception’ in which multispecies negotiations are already in progress (149). 
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